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THE WASHINGTON REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
FORFEITURE ACT
Linda S. Hume*
The Real Estate Contract Forfeiture Act (the Act), which became ef-
fective January 1, 1986,1 creates a nonjudicial procedure for forfeiture of
the purchaser's interest in a real estate contract2 that terminates the pur-
chaser's rights in the contract and in the real property that is the subject
matter of the contract. 3 Compliance with the Act's procedures should clear
the seller's title to the property. The Act represents a significant departure
from common law forfeiture procedures. This discussion will trace the
origins of the Act, explain its basic design and purpose, and indicate where
the Act changes or parallels the prior common law. In addition, some areas
of future uncertainty that may arise under the new Act will be discussed.
I. BACKGROUND
The drafting of the Act followed several years of controversy concerning
the use of real estate contracts for financing the sale of real property. Some
attorneys thought that the legislature should abolish real estate contracts or
treat real estate contracts like deeds of trust for purposes of terminating the
purchaser's interest.4 Several reasons were advanced for this position,
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. California State University at Los
Angeles, B.A., 1967; U.C.L.A., J.D., 1970. Professor Hume was a member of the subcommittee that
drafted the Real Estate Contract Forfeiture Act.
1. 1985 Wash. Laws ch. 237 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE §§ 61.30.010-.910).
2. The Act defines a real estate contract as "any written agreement for the sale of real property in
which legal title to the property is retained by the seller as security for payment of the purchase price."
WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.010(1) (1985). Earnest money agreements and options are not included. Id.
The committee that drafted the Act, see infra note 8, decided to include only contracts in which the
contract was used as a financing device similar to the mortgage or deed of trust because the issues raised
by forfeiture of this kind of real estate contract are similar to those raised by foreclosure of mortgages or
deeds of trust. Although an earnest money agreement may provide for forfeiture in the event of
nonperformance, that issue is best resolved through application of the traditional doctrine governing
liquidated damages for breach of contract. The functional, open-ended definition was chosen deliber-
ately to give courts the flexibility to apply the Act to contracts that served as a financing device
regardless of what the parties actually called the contract. For an example of a contract that in fact was
used as a financing device, but called an "earnest money" agreement, see Reed v. Eller, 33 Wn. App.
820, 664 P.2d 515 (1983).
3. "'Forfeit' means to cancel the purchaser's rights under a real estate contract and to terminate all
right, title, and interest in the property of the purchaser and, to the extent provided in this chapter, of
persons claiming by or through the purchaser." WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.010(4) (1985).
4. D. Anderson, Real Estate Contract Forfeiture Act, Legislative History, 3-5 (Sept. 21, 1985),
Continuing Legal Education Seminar Materials (available Univ. of Wash. School of Law Library),
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probably the most important of which was the ability of the seller to abuse
forfeiture rights.5 In addition, it was unclear what procedural steps were
necessary to achieve an effective forfeiture and clear the seller's title,
particularly in western Washington. 6 In the event judicial action was
needed, it was costly and time-consuming. Other lawyers, primarily those
in eastern Washington, thought the real estate contract was an especially
useful financing device, and did not experience procedural or title problems
in accomplishing forfeitures. 7
Eventually, the Washington State Bar Association agreed to draft a
comprehensive statute. 8 The drafting committee had several objectives: to
make the forfeiture procedures for real estate contracts consistent with
existing mortgage foreclosure and deed of trust statutes; to increase the
reliability of public records; to balance the rights of the seller and purchaser
in a way that would prevent the worst abuses; to make the procedures clear
and easy to follow; and finally, to avoid the need for judicial action to
achieve forfeiture. 9 The Act largely reflects these objectives. The commit-
tee did not attempt to make any particular financing device more desirable
[hereinafter cited as Drafting History]. See generally Warren, California Installment Land Sales
Contracts: A Time for Reform, 9 UCLA L.REv. 608 (1962).
5. Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee had recounted the exploits of an unscrupulous
Washington seller who sold the same property over and over again after purporting to "forfeit" previous
purchasers without notice. Letter from Senator Phil Talmadge to Robert M. Leadon (January 30, 1984)
(discussing the testimony of Susan Agid, Assistant Attorney General, before the Senate Judiciary
Committee) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
6. Drafting History, supra note 4, at 4-5.
7. Drafting History, supra note 4, at 4. Real estate contracts are widely used in Eastern Washington
because the deed of trust act exempts agricultural property, WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.030(2) (1985),
and a mortgage must be foreclosed by judicial action. Id. § 61.12.030. Eastern Washington title
companies were willing to insure title after forfeiture without a quiet title action. In western Washing-
ton, title companies would not insure title without ajudicial orderquieting title in the forfeiting contract
seller. Drafting History, supra note 4, at 4-5.
8. The Act was drafted by a subcommittee of the Real Property, Trust, and Probate Section of the
Washington State Bar Association. It was sponsored in the Washington Legislature by Senator Phil
Talmadge as Senate Bill No. 3091, 1985 Wash. Laws ch. 237.
Senator Talmadge had prepared a real estate contract forfeiture bill for the Washington Legislature in
1983. See Drafting History, supra note 4, at 5-6. It was largely based on the Iowa statute governing real
estate contract forfeitures. IOWA CODE ANN. ch. 656 (West 1982). Senator Talmadge agreed to postpone
introduction of the bill while the committee worked to draft a more comprehensive statute. Minutes of
Committee Meeting (February 2, 1984) (on file with the Washington Law Review). The subcommittee
was chaired by Robert M. Leadon, a Yakima attorney, and consisted of attorneys Douglas G. Anderson,
W. Ronald Hulen, and David H. Rockwell, from western Washington; attorney Ned M. Barnes,
Spokane; attorney Kim Prochnau, Evergreen Legal Services; attorney Warren S. Olson, Transamerica
Title; attorney Kyle Aiken, Staff Counsel to the Washington State Senate; and Professor Linda Hume,
University of Washington School of Law. The Committee represented a cross section of the legal
community.
9. Real Property, Trust & Probate Section, Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Comments to the Proposed Real
Estate Contract Forfeiture Act, 2-3 (undated) (unpublished) (on file with the Washington Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Drafters' Comments].
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than any other. 10 It simply preserved the real estate contract as one of the
financing devices available to buyers and sellers while clarifying the
procedure for forfeiture. The Act is, therefore, primarily procedural and the
parties are free, as at common law, to fashion their own bargain provided
the minimum procedural requirements of the Act are observed. 1
II. BASIC OPERATION OF THE STATUTE
The basic design of the Act is quite simple. If the seller desires to forfeit a
defaulting purchaser's interest, the seller first sends the purchaser a notice
of intent to forfeit. 12 Following receipt of this notice, the purchaser has
ninety days in which to "cure" the default.13 If the default is not cured,
seller sends the purchaser a declaration of forfeiture. 14 This declaration
effectively terminates the purchaser's interest in the real estate contract and
in the property and no further action should be required to clear title. 15 Any
interest dependent on the purchaser's, for example a mortgage on the
purchaser's interest, may be eliminated by giving the same notices to the
interest holder. 16
In addition to setting up the basic procedure, the statute sets out the
precise contents of each of the required notices, 17 the parties to whom the
10. Drafting History, supra note 4, at 6-7.
11. Id. at 7; Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at 1-3. An example of the drafting freedom
remaining with the parties is found in WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.010(10) (1985), which permits the
parties to agree that the time for cure may be any period longer than 90 days.
12. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.020 (1985) provides that "[f]orfeiture shall be accomplished by
giving and recording the required notices as specified in this chapter." The "required notices" are the
notice of intent to forfeit and the declaration of forfeiture. Id. at § 61.30.010(8). These provisions must
be read together with WASH. Rsv. CODE § 61.30.030(2) (1985), which conditions the right to forfeiture
on a breach of the purchaser's obligations under the contract.
13. Id. § 61.30.090(2).
14. Id. § 61.30.070(2). The two notices are known collectively as the "required notices." See
supra note 12.
15. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.100 (1985). Subsection (2)(a) provides that rights in the contract and
to the property are terminated. Subsection (1) states that the recorded and sworn declaration of forfeiture
is prima facie evidence of the forfeiture and conclusive evidence of the forfeiture in favor of bona fide
purchasers and encumbrancers for value. This should be sufficient to enable seller to obtain title
insurance on resale. Committee member Warren Olson, counsel for Transamerica Title Insurance,
represented the views of title insurers. The title insurance companies have not taken a formal position on
this matter. Drafting History, supra note 4, at 26.
16. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.100(2)(a) (1985). The other persons whose interests maybe forfeited
are listed in WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.040(2) (1985). They include lienholders (secured and un-
secured), junior real estate contractors, and occupants of the property. The right to cure is granted to
these parties in WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.090(2) (1985).
17. Id. § 61.30.070. The notice of intent to forfeit must contain: (1) sellers' name, address, and
telephone number, (2) a description of the contract and a legal description of the property; (3) a
description of the default; (4) notification of the right to cure; (5) notification of the effect of forfeiture;
and (6) any other information required by the contract. The declaration of forfeiture must contain:'(1)
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notices must be sent if their interests are to be forfeited, 18 methods of
service of the notices, 19 the effect of failure to give the notices, 20 and the
method and acceptability of cure.21 The statute also covers the circum-
stances under which a public sale may be ordered in lieu of forfeiture22 and
the appropriate grounds to enjoin 23 or set aside24 a forfeiture.
III. EFFECTS OF THE STATUTE
Attorneys will find much that is familiar in the Act because several of its
provisions are codifications of common law that applied to real estate
contracts prior to the Act. The Real Estate Contract Forfeiture Act, how-
ever, can be expected to cause difficulty arising from two sources-the
newness of the procedures themselves and the open questions not answered
by the Act. First, the Act's procedures are quite different from the ones with
which attorneys are currently familiar-they will take some "getting used
seller's name, address, and telephone number; (2) a description of the contract and a legal description of
the property; (3) notification of the rights that have been forfeited; (4) notification that seller is entitled to
possession; (5) affirmation of compliance with the Act; and (6) notification of the right to set aside the
forfeiture. Id.
18. Id. § 61.30.040. Those who must be notified include the purchaser, holders of liens on the
purchaser's interest, holders of subordinate contract interests, and occupants of the property. Id.
19. Id. § 61.30.050. Notices may be given as provided in the contract, by personal service, by
mail, or in appropriate circumstances by posting and publication. The notices must be in writing. Id.
20. Id. § 61.30.080. Sellers must start overif they fail to give notice to all the parties they desire to
forfeit. In other words, the seller cannot simply give notices to the persons left out the first time and
proceed, but must instead again give notice to parties who may have received prior notices. The new
notice must indicate that it supercedes and replaces prior notices. Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at
10. Failure to give notice to each purchaser renders the entire procedure void. WASH. REv. CODE
§ 61.30.040(1) (1985). In contrast, failure to give notice to persons whose interests are dependent on the
purchasers only makes the forfeiture "void as to each person. . . to whom the notices are not given."
WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.040(2) (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 115-28.
21. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.090 (1985). Cure is defined as:
perform[ing] the obligations under the contract which are described in the notice of intent to forfeit
and which are in default, to pay the costs and attorneys' fees prescribed in the contract, and, subject
to RCW [WASH. REv. CODE] 61.30.090(1), to make all payments of money required of the
purchaser by the contract which first become due after the notice of intent to forfeit is given and are
due when cure is tendered.
Id. § 61.30.010(2).
22. Id. § 61.30.120. See infra text accompanying notes 57-65.
23. The Act limits the grounds on which a forfeiture can be restrained to: (I) proof that there is no
default; (2) proof that the purchaser has an offsetting claim that would excuse the default; and (3) proof
that the seller has failed materially to comply with the Act. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.110(3) (1985).
24. The completed forfeiture can be set aside only when it is established that seller was not entitled
to forfeit (as for example, when the purchaser was not in breach) or that the seller failed materially to
comply with the Act. The forfeiture may never be set aside if the rights of bona fide purchasers or
encumbrancers for value would be adversely affected by this action. Id. § 61.30.140. This parallels the
Deed of Trust Act in disfavoring upsetting a completed forfeiture. See id. § 61.24.040(7).
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to." These procedures fall into two groups: those that represent a substan-
tive change in pre-Act rights and those that elaborate the basic statutory
scheme. Second, some questions of immediate importance remain to be
interpreted either by litigation or corrections to the Act itself.
A. Codification of Common Law
The Act leaves unchanged several important pre-Act principles. The
basic forfeiture concept is the same. The right to forfeit must be a part of the
contract and is not available if the contract is silent.25 Remedies other than
forfeiture are not affected by the statute and may be pursued indepen-
dently.26 Finally, and probably most significantly, the consequences of
forfeiture have not been changed. After forfeiture, the purchaser's rights in
the contract and in the property subject to the contract are terminated. 27 The
rights of any parties whose interests were dependent on the existence of the
purchaser's rights are also terminated if they were properly served with the
required notices. 28 The seller can also keep any payments made prior to
forfeiture, but is not entitled to a deficiency judgment.29 The Act permits
the parties to vary the consequences of forfeiture by agreement. 30
25. Id. § 61.30.030(2). For the common law position, see Taylor v. Interstate Inv. Co., 75 Wash.
490, 135 P. 240 (1913). The contract must also contain a "time is of the essence" provision, or else the
purchaser has the entire contracted time period to complete payment. Lillis v. Steinbach, 51 Wash. 402,
99 P. 22 (1909). Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at 5.
26. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.020 (1985). The seller can sue for damages, Hogan v. Kyle, 7 Wash.
595, 35 P. 399 (1894), installments as they fall due, Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297, 34 P. 1100 (1893);
or specific performance, Wood v. Mastick, 2 Wash. Terr. 64, 3 P. 612 (1891). Seller can also wait until
all payments are due and then sue for the purchase price. Frst Nat'l Bank v. Mapson, 181 Wash. 196, 42
P.2d 782 (1935).
27. WASH. R v. CODE § 61.30.100(2)(a) (1985).
28. Id. § 61.30.100(2)(a). Welling v. Mt. Si Bowl, 79 Wn. 2d. 485, 487 P.2d 620 (1971); cfi.
Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wn. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969).
29. WASH. Rav. CODE § 61.30.100(2)(b)-.100(3) (1985). For common law and theory permitting
seller to keep payments, see Reddish v. Smith, 10 Wash. 178, 38 P. 1003 (1894). The seller may not sue
for additional amounts due under the contract. The theory is that the contract is terminated following
forfeiture and there is, therefore, no basis on which to collect more of the purchase price. Rose v.
Rundall, 86 Wash. 422, 150 P. 614 (1915).
Courts in other states have ordered restitution following forfeiture on an unjust enrichment theory. To
calculate the amount of restitution, the purchaser is given credit for amounts paid on the contract and
then is charged a fair rental value for the time the property was occupied. E.g., Freedman v. Rector, 37
Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951); Weyher v. Peterson, 16 Utah 2d 278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965). For a
discussion of the Freedman opinion, see Comment, Forfeiture Clauses in Land Installment Contracts:
Time for Equitable Foreclosure, 8 U. PUGEr Sou D L. REv. 85 (1984).
30. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.100(2) (1985).
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B. Major Changes in the Forfeiture Procedure
1. Recording
The Act places great emphasis on recording in order to further the
drafting committee's objective of increasing the reliability of public rec-
ords. The Act requires that the contract, the notice of intent to forfeit and
the declaration of forfeiture be recorded in each county in which any part of
the property is located. 31 This is a marked change from the current practice
in which the real estate contract and forfeiture documents are rarely
recorded. Until recently, the purchaser under a real estate contract could
not qualify as a "bona fide purchaser" within the meaning of the Recording
Act even if the contract was recorded. 32 Although a contract can be
recorded just prior to beginning a forfeiture, 33 it will be important hence-
forth to ensure that all real estate contracts are in recordable form.
Despite the Act's emphasis on recording, the effect of a failure to record
the required notices is not clear, except in the case of recording the contract
itself. Recording the contract is a condition precedent to forfeiture. 34
However, although the Act requires that the notice of intent to forfeit and
the declaration of forfeiture be recorded, 35 it does not directly state what
31. It is a condition precedent to forfeiture that the contract be recorded in each county in which any
of the property is located. Id. § 61.30.030(1). The notice of intent to forfeit must be recorded "before
the commencement of the time for cure." Id. § 61.30.040(5). The declaration of forfeiture must be
recorded "after the time for cure has expired without the default having been cured." Id.
§ 61.30.040(6). WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.070(2) (1985) permits the seller to forfeit the contract by
"giving and recording a declaration of forfeiture." On the effect of failure to record, see infra text
accompanying notes 33-42.
32. In Reed v. Eller, 33 Wn. App. 820,664 P.2d 515 (1983), the court held that areal estate contract
purchaser could not be a bona fide purchaser protected by the recording act until the purchaser acquired
legal title to the property. The purchaser does not get legal title until the contract is completely
performed since the seller retains legal title as security for payment of the purchase price. The Reed
court relied on Peterson v. Paulson, 24 Wn. 2d 166, 163 P.2d 830 (1945). Peterson was decided at a time
when the judicial view of the nature of the purchaser's interest in the land subject to a real estate contract
was quite narrow. One opinion had stated a real estate contract purchaser had no interest, legal or
equitable, in the property that was the subject of the contract. Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649,233 P.
29 (1925), overruled, Cascade Sec. Bank v. Butler, 88 Wn. 2d 777, 567 P.2d 631 (1977). Following the
decision in Reed, the recording act was amended to permit recording of real estate contracts. WASH.
REV. CODE § 65.08.060-.070 (1985). Drafting History, supra note 4, at 1-3. The amendments to the
Recording Act, coupled with the change in the judicial view of the purchaser's interest reflected in the
overruling of Ashford, should change the Reed holding. See Hume, Real Estate Contracts and the
Doctrine of Equitable Conversion in Washington: Dispelling the Ashford Cloud, 7 U. PUGEr SouND L.
REv. 233 (1984).
33. Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at 5. The term "purchaser" includes every person to whom
any estate or interest in real property is conveyed for a valuable consideration. WASH. REv. CODE
§ 65.08.060(2) (1985). A purchaser acts in "good faith" when they have no notice of an outstanding
equity. See, e.g., Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wn. 2d 170, 685 P.2d 1074 (1984).
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.030(1) (1985).
35. See supra note 31.
808
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consequence flows from the failure to record these notices. The argument
that the forfeiture is invalid if the required notices are not recorded is
supported by language that states that forfeiture is accomplished by "giv-
ing and recording the required notices" 36 and that the seller "may forfeit the
contract by giving and recording a declaration of forfeiture. ", 37 In addition,
the language accompanying the recording requirement for the notice of
intent to forfeit suggests that the cure period might not begin to run until the
notice of intent to forfeit is recorded. 38 Other language indicates that the
declaration of forfeiture cannot be recorded until the cure period has
expired. 39 If the cure period never begins to run, the forfeiture procedure
could never be consummated.
These arguments are, however, at best indirect inferences. All that is
penalized in a direct sense is the failure to give the required notices. n° The
Act states that the entire procedure is void only if there is a failure to give
notice to the purchaser,41 and that the procedure is void as to the interest of
other parties to whom notice must be given only if there is a failure to give
notice to those parties. 42 Consequently, it can be argued that if the required
notices are in fact given to the appropriate parties, the forfeiture is valid
regardless of whether the notices are recorded. The Act also provides that
forfeiture may be enjoined or set aside if there is a "material failure" to
comply with the Act. 43 However, in the absence of clear consequences
attached to the failure to record the required notices, it is doubtful that
failure to record, especially in the case of the notice of intent to forfeit, is a
material noncompliance.
It is clear from the statutory references to recording and from the drafting
history of the Act that the drafters intended that the required notices be
recorded. 44 It is unfortunate that the Act does not directly state the penalty
for a failure to record as it does for the failure to give the required notices. 45
36. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.020 (1985).
37. Id. § 61.30.070(2).
38. Id. § 61.30.040(5) (notice of intent to forfeit "shall be recorded" after time for cure has passed
without default being cured).
39. Id. § 61.30.040(6) (declaration of forfeiture "shall be recorded" after time for cure has passed
without default being cured).
40. Id. § 61.30.040(1)-.040(2).
41. Id. § 61.30.040(1).
42. Id. § 61.30.040(2).
43. See supra notes 23-24.
44. Drafting History, supra note 4, at 7, 11; Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at 4, 7-8.
45. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
809
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2. Cure
The Act accomplishes another major change by requiring that the seller
give a minimum of ninety days to cure the default46 and by stating that an
effective cure reinstates the contract. 47 In this respect the Act represents a
beneficial compromise-in return for a forfeiture procedure that does not
require judicial action, the opportunity to cure is mandatory. In addition,
the cure can be effected simply by bringing the contract current in the
absence of an otherwise valid due on sale clause.48 After a notice of intent to
forfeit is recorded and served, the purchaser and those entitled to receive
the required notices may cure the default by paying all amounts due under
the contract, which include amounts owing at the time the notice of intent is
recorded, amounts accruing during the cure period and costs and attorneys
fees if permitted by contract. 49 If the cure is tendered, the contract is
reinstated and the seller is required to record confirmation of cure. 50
Prior to the Act, in theory at least, the seller did not have to give the
purchaser the opportunity to cure.51 The forfeiture was effective when the
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.010(10) (1985) provides that "time for cure" is the time provided in
WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.070(1)(e), which states that the time period is 90 days. The minimum 90 day
period was part of the committee's effort to fairly balance the "rights, remedies, liabilities and
responsibilities among the parties to a contract, while permitting those parties a significant amount of
freedom in the manner in which they chose to structure their arrangement." Drafters' Comments, supra
note 9, at 2; Drafting History, supra note 4, at 7.
47. "Cure" means to perform the obligations under the contract which are in default. WASH. REV.
CODE § 61.30.010(2) (1985). Cure reinstates the contract. Id. § 61.30.090(4).
48. Id. § 61.30.090(1). For the appropriateness of acceleration of the balance of the contract on
sale, see Terry v. Born, 24 Wn. App. 652, 604 P.2d 504 (1979).
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.010(2) (1985). For parties entitled to cure, see id.
§§ 61.30.040(1)-.040(2) and id. § 61.30.090(2).
50. Id. §§ 61.30.090(4)-.090(5).
51. The purchaser had to file an action and show that relief from forfeiture should be granted. To
obtain any relief at all, the purchaser had to show "equities" that required judicial intervention for
relief. E.g., Krieg v. Salkovics, 18 Wn. 2d 180, 138 P.2d 855 (1943); Sofie v. Kane, 32 Wn. App. 889,
650 P.2d 1124 (1982). A party whose interest was dependent on the purchaser's, for example a
mortgagee of the purchaser's interest, could pay amounts in default to avoid the forfeiture, but the seller
was not even required to notify these parties of the default and pending forfeiture unless seller had actual
notice of their interest. Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wn. 2d 456,452 P.2d 222 (1969). If the purchaser sought
a grace period, the court would weigh the relative equities of the parties to determine both the length of
the grace period and whether the default could be cured by paying off the entire contract balance or by
bringing payments current. Factors that can be identified are: payment of a substantial portion of the
purchase price, John R. Hansen, Inc. v. Pacific Int'l Corp., 76 Wn. 2d 220, 455 P.2d 946 (1969);
improvements by purchaser and an offer to pay the purchaser price, or a technical default, State ex rel.
Foley v. Superior Court, 57 Wn. 2d 571, 358 P.2d 550 (1961); an honest dispute over amounts owed,
Wallis v. Elliott, 154 Wash. 625, 282 P. 928 (1929); suggestion that seller is overreaching, Dill v.
Zielke, 26 Wn. 2d 246, 173 P.2d 977 (1946). For length of grace period, see infra note 57. For
reinstatement and acceleration, see infra notes 55-56. Courts commonly refused to permit purchasers
simply to reinstate the contract by bringing payments current if the seller would suffer financially. E.g.,
Hansen, 76 Wn. 2d at 220, 455 P.2d at 946.
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declaration of forfeiture was given.52 In addition, the seller did not have to
give notice of intent to forfeit to any party whose interest was acquired after
the purchaser's unless the seller had actual notice of the party.53 In practice,
however, a seller often had to bring a judicial action to declare forfeiture or
quiet title.54 As part of the judicial action, courts often granted a cure or
"grace" period within which the contract could be reinstated either by
bringing the contract current 55 or paying the entire amount of the con-
tract. 56 There was much uncertainty about the length of the grace period
because this matter rested with the discretion of the court.57 This pre-Act
uncertainty about the need to bring ajudicial action, whether a grace period
would be granted, and its length, is avoided under the Act.
The Act also gives the seller protection against abuse of the mandatory
cure period. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the period for cure can
be extended only by court order and only in the case of nonmonetary
defaults. 58 In addition, a request for extension of the cure period must be
accompanied by a showing that despite "due diligence" it is not possible to
cure within ninety days and that in all other respects, the party is able to
cure (for example, in the case of both a monetary and nonmonetary
default). 59
The seller need not, but may, accept a partial or late cure.60 In the case of
the partial cure, the seller must notify the party tendering the cure that it is
only a partial cure in order to avoid any possible problem with a cure that is
tendered in the mistaken belief that it is a complete cure.61 If a partial cure
has been tendered under such a mistaken belief, the tendering party may
52. Sleeper v. Bragdon, 45 Wash. 562, 88 P. 1036 (1907).
53. Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wn. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969).
54. See generally G. Nm.sON & D. WHTMA, REAL ESTATE FINANcE LAW § 3.28 (2d ed. 1985). A
major reason for this Act, in the view of many attorneys, was to avoid the necessity for judicial action.
Drafting History, supra note 4, at 7.
55. John R. Hansen, Inc. v. Pacific Int'l Corp., 76 Wn. 2d 220, 455 P.2d 946 (1969); Moeller v.
Good Hope Farms, 35 Wn. 2d 777, 215 P.2d 425 (1950); Dill v. Zilke, 26 Wn. 2d 246, 173 P.2d 977
(1946).
56. Bruckart v. Cook, 30 Wn. 2d 4, 190 P.2d 725 (1948); Central Life Assur. Soe'y v. Impelmans,
13 Wn. 2d 632, 126 P.2d 757 (1942); Great Western Inv. Co. v. Anderson, 162 Wn. 58, 297 P. 1087
(1931); Wallis v. Elliott, 154 Wn. 625,282 P. 928 (1929); Zane v. Hinds, 136 Wn. 352, 240 P. 6 (1925);
Will Rogers Farm Agency v. Stafford, 4 Wn. App. 500, 482 P.2d 336 (1971).
57. Grace periods varied from thirty days to six months. E.g., Radach v. Prior, 48 Wn. 2d 901,297
P.2d 605 (1956) (thirty days); John R. Hansen, Inc. v. Pacific Int'l, 76 Wn. 2d220,455 P.2d 946 (1969)
(six months). There was no standard length of time. Great W. Inv. Co. v. Anderson, 162 Wash. 58,297
P. 1087 (1931).
58. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.110 (1985).
59. Id. § 61.30.110(3).
60. Id. § 61.30.090(3); Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at 12-13.
61. Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at 12-13.
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request that the seller refund the amounts tendered and the seller is required
to make such a refund or face statutory liability for failure to do so. 6 2
3. Public Sale
A third major change in pre-Act law is the new public sale protection for
some purchasers. 63 A purchaser with substantial equity in the property
subject to forfeiture may be unable to cure within the relatively short
ninety-day period. Since the Act also forecloses the possibility that this
purchaser could seek an extension of the cure period for a monetary
default, 64 the solution is to ask a court to order a public sale of the property
in lieu of forfeiture. 65
The request for a public sale may be made by any party entitled to cure
under the Act and must be made prior to the expiration of the original cure
period. 66 Before ordering a sale, a court must find that the fair market value
of the property substantially exceeds the unpaid contract balance and other
outstanding obligations against the property.67 Following the sale, the
proceeds of the sale are used to pay the seller and other outstanding
obligations. Any surplus is distributed to the purchaser. 68
Prior to the Act, purchasers who were unable to cure (or sell their
interests to others who could) could not successfully request a sale in lieu of
forfeiture on any ground. The purchaser's equity in the property was only
one of the factors that would be considered by the court in awarding a grace
period within which to cure. 69 Courts in some states had ordered contract
forfeiture under analogous mortgage procedures. However, apart from
several very early cases in which real estate contracts were foreclosed as
mortgages, no Washington court had so ordered. 70 Consequently, the Act,
62. Id. (notification and responsibility to refund on request require seller to provide reasonable
time to address mistakenly tendered cures).
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.120 (1985).
64. Id. § 61.30.110(3).
65. Id. § 61.30.120.
66. Id. § 61.30.120(1)-.120(2). This could be either the statutory 90 day minimum or a longer
period agreed to in the contract. Id. § 61.30.010(10).
67. Id. § 61.30.120(3).
68. Id. § 61.30.120(6). There should, of course, be a surplus if the statutory criteria, see supra text
accompanying note 67, were correctly applied.
69. The only relief from forfeiture was in the form of a grace period within which the purchaser
could cure by paying off either the entire balance of the contract or bring the contract current and
reinstate it. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. See, e.g., State ex rel. Foley v. Superior
Court, 57 Wn. 2d 571, 358 P.2d 550 (1961).
70. For cases foreclosing contracts as equitable mortgages, see Aylward v. Lally, 147 Wash. 29,
264 P. 983 (1928); Roy v. Vaughn, 100 Wash. 345,170 P. 1019 (1918). See also Nelson v. Robinson, 184
Kan. 340, 336 P.2d 415 (1959). For cases foreclosing contracts under statutory foreclosure procedure,
see Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226,301 N.E.2d 641 (1973), and Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381
(Ky. 1979). See generally G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 54, at § 3.29.
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on an appropriate showing, gives some additional protection to purchasers
not available at common law. This protection gives the purchaser and other
lienholders a means to recover the value in the property over and above the
amount owed to seller. The provision is also a safeguard in a procedure that
terminates valuable property rights without the involvement of a court or a
disinterested third party such as a trustee.71
C. Other New Statutory Procedures
The Act contains some highly technical procedural requirements that
require vigilance during forfeiture. Sellers must take prompt action to serve
appropriate parties after recording. The notice of intent to forfeit must be
"given not later than ten days after it is recorded." 7 2 Similarly, the declara-
tion of forfeiture must be given within three days of the date it is recorded. 73
A notice is "given" for purposes of the Act when served, mailed, posted or
first published. 74 There are also very specific requirements about the
content75 of the notice of intent to forfeit and the declaration of forfeiture
and who can appropriately sign each notice. 76 Interestingly enough, how-
ever, no adverse consequences appear to flow from failure to observe these
technical requirements. The Act only penalizes the "failure to give"
notices and is completely silent about the failure to give notices within the
statutorily required time or that are not in the statutorily required form. 77
Consequently, there would appear to be no penalty for failure to observe
other requirements in the Act, except that a "material" failure to comply
with the Act furnishes grounds for restraint of forfeiture78 and for setting
aside a forfeiture. 79 However, it is doubtful that minor variations in these
technical requirements would amount to material noncompliance.
71. Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at 17-18.
72. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.060 (1985).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 61.30.050(3).
75. Id. § 61.30.070.
76. Id. § 61.30.050(1). The notice of intent to forfeit may be signed by seller, or seller's agent or
attorney. By contrast, the declaration of forfeiture can only be signed by the seller. The drafters believed
that because of the importance of the declaration of forfeiture, the seller should be required to sign it
under penalty of perjury. Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at 8.
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.040 (1985). Failure to give notice to the purchaser makes the
forfeiture void. Failure to give notice to others makes the forfeiture void as to the interest of the party
that did not receive the notice.
78. Id. § 61.30.110(3).
79. Id. § 61.30.140(4).
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IV. PROBLEM AREAS
Although the Act sets out detailed procedures for forfeiture, some areas
will no doubt require judicial interpretation. In one area-retroactivity-
an immediate challenge to the Act can be expected. In others, judicial
interpretation will be necessary to resolve questions not answered by the
Act itself.
A. Retroactivity
The Act's retroactive effect may present difficult issues. 80 The Act states
that it applies to all real estate contract forfeitures initiated on or after its
effective date, regardless of when the real estate contract was entered
into.81 Since the forfeiture procedures in the Act are the sole method for
forfeiture of real estate contracts, 82 the Act will no doubt be challenged on
the ground that it applies retroactively in an impermissible manner. The
decision to make the Act retroactive was based on the belief that it changes
only remedies and does not affect substantive rights, as well as a policy
decision that it is better to have a uniform procedure for forfeiture rather
than endure a lengthy period of dual methods of forfeiture. 83
Although the Act does not change the basic common law consequences
of forfeiture, 84 the mandatory cure and public sale provisions are signifi-
cant departures from the common law and the invalidation of acceleration
clauses directly abrogates a provision contained in most real estate con-
tracts. Additionally, the Act makes cure and reinstatement mandatory
regardless of the relative position of the buyer and seller, 85 whereas such
decisions were left to the courts' discretion at common law.86 Finally, the
Act permits the property to be sold at a public sale-something never
permitted at common law. 87 The Act, therefore, gives purchasers rights
where none previously existed and diminishes the rights of sellers. The
seller no longer has an unfettered, bargained for right to forfeit or accelerate
the debt on default. Nor does the seller have the right to have his economic
80. There are numerous Washington cases that discuss the retroactive application of statutes and
they are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. Sutherland's observation that judicial statements of the
standards being applied are little more than ways to restate the problem is apt. 2 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, at 260 (4th ed. 1973). At least one Washington case recognizes the problem.
See In re Santore, 28 Wn. App. 319, 623 P.2d 702 (1981).
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.910 (1985).
82. Id. § 61.30.020.
83. Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at 25; Drafting History, supra note 4, at 28-29.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
85. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.030.090(4) (1985).
86. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.120 (1985). See supra notes 58-59 & 63.
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position or other equities evaluated by a court before a right to cure is
grahted.
Courts evaluating the retroactive application of statutes begin with a
presumption that a statute applies prospectively, but will apply a statute
retroactively, particularly where there is evidence that the legislature
intended retroactive application. 88 If the court finds evidence of legislative
intent, it will approve retroactive application in instances where a common
law right is affected, 89 or where only procedures or remedies are being
changed. 90 Retroactive application is not permitted, however, where a
vested right or a contract right would be affected. 91
The cases in which retroactive changes have been approved by the
Washington courts are distinguishable from the retroactive changes made
by the Act. First, contract rights are more directly affected by the retroac-
tive changes in the Act because the Act invalidates acceleration clauses and
grants a minimum ninety day cure period instead of the thirty days agreed
to in most contracts. 92 Second, sellers have vested rights under the
88. In most cases, the court must infer that the legislature intended the statute to apply retroactively
from words used in the statute. See, e.g., Agency Budget v. Wash. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 93 Wn. 2d 416,610
P.2d 361 (1980). A clear expression of intent, such as is present in the Act, should be very persuasive. See
In re Marriage of MacDonald, 104 Wn. 2d 745, 709 P.2d 1196 (1985), where the court found direct
evidence that the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act was to be applied retroactively in
the language of the statute and its legislative history. Cf. Johnston v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 85 Wn. 2d
637, 538 P.2d 510 (1975).
89. Some cases contain the flat statement that retroactive changes of the common law are always
permissible. E.g., Overlake Homes, Inc. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 57 Wn. 2d 881, 360 P.2d 570
(1961) (retroactive change of bank's common law obligation to customer).
90. Retroactive changes in the extent of recovery for tort actions was approved because the change
resulted in a "more complete, workable and effective remedy." Godfrey v. State, 84 Wn. 2d 959, 965,
530 P.2d 630, 633 (1975) (emphasis in original). For a retroactive change in the method of service of
process, see Tellier v. Edwards, 56 Wn. 2d 652, 354 P.2d 925 (1960).
91. In Johnston v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 85 Wn. 2d 637,538 P.2d 510 (1975), the court refused
to apply the Consumer Protection Act retroactively since the rights created by that Act had not existed at
common law, and in Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wn. 2d 170, 685 P.2d 1074 (1984), the court refused to
apply a provision changing redemption notices retroactively because it would affect title transferred
under prior execution sales.
92. WASH. REv CODE § 61.30.090(1) (1985). All real estate contracts using standard form A-1964
permit a seller to collect attorney's fees if it is necessary to "bring suit" to enforce the contract. For form
A-1964, see 2 WASH. REAL PROP. DFSKBOOK, ch. 37.46 at SU-37-23-26 (1979). Since the Act's
forfeiture procedures are entirely nonjudicial, this provision of many contracts is also affected.
Although "costs and attorney's fees prescribed in the contract" must be paid in order to cure, no
attorney's fees are due under form A-1964 until suit. It is, therefore, inappropriate to request that
attorney's fees be paid as part of cure. If such a demand were made, it could be viewed as a material
noncompliance with the Act, which authorizes payment of attorney's fees as part of a cure only when
authorized by the contract. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.010(2) (1985). Material noncompliance is
grounds to restrain the forfeiture or set the forfeiture aside. Id. §§ 61.30.110-. 140.
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definitions of vested rights given in previous cases. 93 The statute affects
these rights because it gives a mandatory, not discretionary, right to cure to
purchasers that delays, beyond the time negotiated in the contract, a seller's
right to enjoyment of property to which seller holds legal title. There are,
however, strong policy reasons that support retroactive application of the
Act despite its impact on contract or vested rights. The Act is a compromise
that attempts to balance the rights of the seller and the purchaser. 94
Although it is accurate to say sellers have lost contract rights, they have also
gained much under the Act's forfeiture provisions. The seller has gained the
advantage of a nonjudicial procedure for forfeiture that avoids the necessity
of bringing an action to forfeit or quiet title and the possibility that a grace
period of longer than ninety days might be ordered in specific cases. There
is no redemption after forfeiture, 95 and title is cleared without waiting
through a redemption period. Cure must be made within precise guidelines
that are known in advance, not determined later by a court. Finally, the
purchaser's right to enjoin or set aside the forfeiture is quite limited. 96
Consequently, a persuasive case can be made that the Act, on balance,
simply provides "a more complete, workable and effective remedy that is
retroactive in effect," and such remedial schemes have been frequently
approved. 97
The drafters of the Act chose to make the Act retroactive because of the
length of duration of many real estate contracts. 98 If the Act did not cover all
contracts at the outset, it might take as long as twenty years before all
contracts were forfeited in the same manner. Uniformity in forfeiture
procedures, especially where the uniformity promotes fairness and bal-
ances the interests of both the seller and the buyer, are important public
policy goals.99 Although the retroactivity question is a close one, it should
be resolved in favor of retroactive application in order to avoid lengthy
periods of dual procedures.
If the Act is applied retroactively, it will be subject to a challenge that it is
an unconstitutional impairment of contract rights under article 1, section
10 of the United States Constitution. Recent Washington cases have moved
from a literal interpretation of the contract clause, particularly in instances
93. A vested right exists if a party enjoys a "legal exemption from the demand of another" or if the
party has a right to the "future enjoyment of property." Godfrey v. State, 84 Wn. 2d 959, 963,530 P.2d
630, 632 (1975); Miebach, 102 Wn. 2d at 181, 685 P.2d at 1081.
94. Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at 1-3.
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.100(2)(a) (1985).
96. Id.§§ 61.30.110-.140.
97. Godfrey v. State, 84 Wn. 2d 959, 965, 530 P.2d 630, 633 (1975).




involving the debtor-creditor relationship or changes that can be charac-
terized as remedial. 100 It is probable, therefore, that such a constitutional
challenge to the Act would be unsuccessful. None of these cases dealt with
a direct abrogation of the right to accelerate, however, and therefore none
approve such direct tampering with a substantive contract right. 101
B. Treatment of Interests Dependent on the Purchasers
The most serious problem with the Real Estate Contract Forfeiture Act is
what it does not say. The omission is most acute in the case of interests
dependent on the continuance of the purchaser's interest because the Act
does not specify comprehensively who is to be notified, what right or
remedy these parties have if they exercise their statutory right to cure, or
what right or remedy they have if the seller fails to give them the required
notices.
1. Notice to Third Parties
The Act requires that the seller give the required notices to "holders of
record . . . of security interests in or liens against the purchaser's inter-
est."' 102 However, it is not clear whether the record to which the statute
refers is the record for deeds and other conveyances kept by the county
auditor or simply any public record. If the reference is only to the real
property records, the seller would not have to give notice to some of the
purchaser's creditors because their liens are kept in separate records. 103 On
the other hand, if the statutory reference is to any lien, wherever entered in
100. Macumber v. Shafer, 96 Wn. 2d 568, 571, 637 P.2d 645, 646-47 (1981). A suspension of
foreclosure procedures was upheld in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), a
case relied on by the Washington Supreme Court in Macumber.
101. For example, Macumber approves the retroactive application of a raise in the monetary
amount of the homestead exemption. The amount of the exemption was not actually a term of the
contract between the parties, but a statutory provision in effect at the time the parties entered into the
contract. The United States Supreme Court approved the suspension of mortgage foreclosure rights on
dates specified in the mortgage contracts in HomeBldg. & LoanAss'n, 290 U.S. at 398, a case relied on
by the Macumber court. Consequently, some kinds of direct tampering with contract rights may not be
unconstitutional.
102. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.040(2)(a) (1985).
103. For example, a judgment becomes a lien on the real property of a debtor when properly
entered or filed with the county clerk in the county in which the real estate is located. Id. § 4.56.200.
The purchaser's interest in a real estate contract is real property for purposes of the judgment lien
statute. Cascade Bank v. Butler, 88 Wn. 2d 777, 567 P.2d 631 (1977). In other instances, the statute
granting the lien provides that the lien is to be recorded in the auditor's index for deeds and conveyances.
E.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 60.04.060 (1985) (mechanics' and materialmen's liens).
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the public records, seller will have to check beyond the record for deeds and
conveyances.
2. Effect of Cure by Third Parties
The Act permits holders of security interests in or liens against the
purchaser's interest to cure the default. 104 Persons holding either seller's or
purchaser's interests in real estate contracts subordinate to the contract
being forfeited and persons occupying the property are also permitted to
cure. 105 The Act is silent, however, on what rights these parties have if they
do cure. The Act states only that timely tender of cure reinstates the
contract. 10 6 One possibility is that the party tendering cure would be
deemed to "step into the shoes" of the purchaser. This is probably not a
desirable interpretation, however, since it could conceivably permit a party
paying as little as one overdue contract installment to acquire the entire
purchaser's equity. A more likely interpretation of the language would be
that the purchaser's interest is reinstated if one of these parties tenders cure.
If this is the interpretation, however, the third party who tenders cure wants
and needs some method to recoup the amounts paid from the purchaser or
from the property.
The various parties given the right to cure by the Act are in very different
legal positions. Therefore, the manner and method of recouping amounts
tendered on behalf of the purchaser should vary depending on the legal
position of the tendering party. The remedies given to a lienholder, a
subordinate contract interest or an occupier of the property should be
different.
A sensible way to treat cure by the holder of a lien would be to add
amounts tendered for cure to the lien. The Deed of Trust Act provides that
amounts tendered to cure by persons having "subordinate liens" are added
to the lien. 107 Since real estate contracts are financing devices like deeds of
trust, it would be appropriate to grant a similar remedy to lienholders who
cure defaults in real estate contracts.
Cure by a party with a subordinate contract interest requires different
treatment because such parties are likely to be attempting to protect their
own ability to complete the subordinate contract, and eventually acquire
title to the property. Simply providing that amounts paid to cure shall be a
lien on whatever property interest the defaulting purchaser possesses will
not adequately recognize the nature of the interest held by the junior. The
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.090(2) (1985).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 61.30.090(4).
107. Id. § 61.24.090(4).
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defaulting senior contract purchaser is in the de facto position of the
original seller. Any title acquired under the purchaser's own contract is
held in trust for the junior purchaser should the junior contract be com-
pleted, and the senior purchaser would be compelled to transfer that title to
the junior on completion of the junior contract.108 Therefore, the position of
the junior contract interest is similar to the position of a grantee from the
mortgagor.10 9 Like the grantee, the junior purchaser should be entitled to
contribution from the senior purchaser under the doctrine of equitable
subrogation. 110 The right of contribution could then be enforced by offset-
ting amounts paid to cure the senior contract against amounts owed on the
junior contract.
The most difficult problem is presented when an occupant of the prop-
erty tenders cure. This difficulty results from the fact that persons occupy-
ing the property can run the gamut from lessees to adverse possessors to,
one supposes, even visitors, if the seller can ascertain their identity"'
within the meaning of the Act. Should any of these parties tender cure, they
should probably be treated under existing doctrines of equitable subroga-
tion, 112 to the extent that the payment is made to protect an interest and not
as a volunteer. 113
3. Omitted Parties
The Act states that if the seller does not give the required notices to the
purchaser, the forfeiture is void. 114 This apparently means that the entire
procedure is a nullity and the seller will have to begin the procedure
again. 115 However, the Act states that if the seller does not give the required
notices to lienholders, subordinate contract interests or occupiers of the
property the forfeiture is "void as to each person. . . to whom the notices
are not given.""16 The Act, therefore, uses the language that traditionally
108. Culmback v. Stevens, 158 Wash. 675, 291 P. 705 (1930).
109. See generally G. NELSON & D. WHlMAN, supra note 54, at § 10.7.
110. Id. § 10.1.
I11. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.040(2)(c) (1985).
112. G. NELSON & D. WHrrmA, supra note 54, at § 10.4.
113. Id. The Act includes a curious provision which allows uninterested parties to record a request
to receive forfeiture notices. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.040(3) (1985). These parties are not, however,
given any right to cure. Since such parties are pure volunteers, they would not be included in the existing
equitable subrogation doctrines.
114. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.040(1) (1985).
115. Id. § 61.30.080; Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at 10.
116. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.040(2) (1985). The drafters used this language to permit a seller to
intentionally fail to give notice to a party to whom notice must otherwise be given and thereby preserve
that party's interest. For example, the drafters wished to permit sellers to preserve economically viable
leases by not notifying lessees of the purchaser of the forfeiture. Drafting History, supra note 4, at 11.
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has been used by courts to describe the effect of ajudicial foreclosure when
a junior interest has been omitted from the foreclosure. 117 However, simply
stating that the forfeiture is void as to an omitted interest does not clarify the
rights the omitted party has vis-a-vis the property or other interests in the
property, either still outstanding or forfeited in the action.
Several interpretations of this statutory provision are plausible. If the
procedure is void as to the omitted interest only, the omitted interest could
simply continue on the property in its current state of title. An omitted lien
would then continue as a lien on the property in the seller's hands. This has
an equitable ring to it since it was, after all, the seller who committed the
error of omission. The effect of such a rule, however, could elevate junior
interests over interests senior to them that were properly forfeited because
the required notices were given. Suppose, for example that the omitted
party was a lien creditor of the purchaser's, subordinate not only to the
purchaser's equity, but to a senior mortgage on the purchaser's interest. If
the lien remains on the property because the party was omitted, it in effect
is elevated over the senior lien and the purchaser.
Analogous mortgage cases take account of the "elevation" problem in
the case of omitted junior lienors by giving them one of two remedies-a
right to foreclose their own lien by sale, with senior liens revived for this
purpose, or the right to redeem senior interests. 118 The right to redeem is
predicated on the existence of the common law "equity of redemption" and
is not statutory. Two Washington cases involving omitted real estate
contract purchasers have used this approach. In Brost v. L.A.N.D., Inc. 119
and Haueter v. Rancich, 120 the omitted party was granted a right to redeem,
in the latter case by paying the purchase price for the property.
However, the Act states that "no person shall have any right, by statute or
otherwise, to redeem the property. "121 Consequently, it would appear that
the only remedy available to the omitted party is the action to set aside the
forfeiture. 122 The Act apparently places parties omitted from a forfeiture
procedure in a position similar to parties omitted in deed of trust fore-
closures and rejects the mortgage analogy. 123 Further, if the success rate in
The conception is flawed, however, because a leasehold interest carved out of a purchaser's interest must
of necessity terminate with the termination of the interest on which it is dependent.
117. Krutz v. Gardner, 25 Wash. 396, 65 P. 771 (1901). See generally G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN,
supra note 54, at § 7.15.
118. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 54, at § 7.15.
119. 37 Wn. App. 372, 680 P.2d 453 (1984).
120. 39 Wn. App. 328, 693 P.2d 168 (1984).
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.100(2)(a) (1985).
122. Id. § 61.30.140.
123. Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at 14; see, e.g., Morrell v. Arctic Trading Co., 21 Wn.





setting aside forfeitures were to parallel the success rate of similar actions
challenging deeds of trust, it could be predicted that it would be difficult to
set aside a forfeiture. 124
The real estate contract, however, differs enough in its legal form from
the deed of trust that the deed of trust analogy is inappropriate. 125 The real
estate contract seller continues to hold title and forfeited interests are
extinguished. There is no independent party in the contract forfeiture
procedure like the trustee under a deed of trust conducting the forfeiture,
nor is there a public sale resulting in a third party purchaser whose rights
must be considered. Consequently, the party omitted from forfeiture lacks
the protection of a public sale and the concern about the security of title in
the hands of a third party purchaser is not present. There is, therefore, no
compelling reason not to permit the omitted party to set aside the forfeiture,
if the party demonstrates the capacity to cure. The reasons that limit the
remedies under deeds of trust do not exist under the Act. Courts should,
therefore, be more indulgent when considering actions to set aside for-
feitures.
Curiously, the peculiar legal form of the real estate contract may also be
the salvation of omitted parties. Because the forfeiture itself involves no
sale and, with one exception, only recorded interests must be notified,
I26 it
should be rare that any party to a later sale can claim to be a bona fide
purchaser or encumbrancer for value capable of defeating an action to set
aside. 127 The forfeiting seller who omitted a recorded interest could not be a
bona fide purchaser, nor could anyone to whom seller conveyed title,
because both would have constructive notice of the omitted party from the
record itself. 128 Therefore, parties omitted from forfeitures should have a
124. No reported Washington case has set aside a deed of trust foreclosure. The Act has a short
statute of limitations for actions to set aside (60 days), although the limitation does not apparently apply
to omitted parties. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.140(2) (1985). Drafters' Comments, supra note 9, at 21.
125. The Washington Supreme Court has held that deeds of trust and mortgages should be treated
similarly for some purposes. Rustad Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Waldt, 91 Wn. 2d 372, 588 P.2d 1153
(1979). However, the court clearly refused to treat the two financing devices similarly on an across the
board basis. This suggests that the court would be sensitive to differences in the form of the different
financing devices.
126. Nonrecorded possessory interests must also be notified if reasonably ascertainable. WASH.
REv. CODE § 61.30.040(2)(c) (1985). Although these interests are not of record and constructive notice
of them would not be provided from the record, possession would not be enough to place purchasers and
encumbrances on inquiry notice. Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wn. 2d 170,685 P.2d 1074 (1984). Butsee
Scott v. Woolard, 12 Wn. App. 109,529 P.2d 30 (1974), which held that because possession of property
by a tenant is not inconsistent with the record holder's right to convey, the possession does not give
notice.
127. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.30.140(4) (1985).
128. This should result from the fact that the Act requires seller to give notice to all interests,
recorded "at the time the notice of intent to forfeit is recorded." Id. § 61.30.040(1). The holding in
Kendrick v. Davis, 75 Wn. 2d 456, 452 P.2d 222 (1969), that seller did not have to give notice to
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much easier time in a set aside action than their deed of trust counterparts.
Finally, omitted parties may challenge forfeiture procedures on constitu-
tional due process grounds. In Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 129
the United States Supreme Court held that before interests are extinguished
by a public sale, every party with a "legally protected property interest"
must receive "notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual
notice. . . when their interests are reasonably ascertainable." Parties that
are totally left out of the forfeiture clearly have been denied due process. In
Mennonite, however, parties whose only notice was by publication were
held to have been denied due process as well. This will cause a particularly
sticky problem with the Act, at least at the outset. As previously discussed,
it has not been customary to record real estate contracts in Washington. It
will then take some years of recording before the records are complete and
reliable. In the meantime, the only "safe" way to forfeit must include
routine publication as permitted in the Act. 130 If any unrecorded, but
"reasonably ascertainable" interest later challenged the forfeiture because
the only notice was by publication, the challenge would appear sound
under Mennonite.
V. CONCLUSION
The Act needs some clarification, either legislative or judicial. It does,
however, provide much needed standardized procedures for forfeiture of
real estate contracts and furthers the policy goals of encouraging the
reliability of public records and clarifying and balancing the rights of both
purchasers and sellers. When coupled with a well-drafted contract, the Act
should make the decision to use this form of real estate financing more
informed.
interests recorded after the real estate contract should be changed by the Act.
129. 462 U.S. 791 (1983). In Mennonite, a recorded mortgagee was not given actual notice of a tax
sale; the only notice offered was by publication.
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.30.050 (1985). The Act permits posting and publication if the
"identity of a person for whom the required notices are intended is not known to or reasonably
discoverable by the seller." To the extent that the "reasonably discoverable" standard set out in the Act,
see supra note 126, parallels the "reasonably ascertainable" standard in Mennonite, notice by publica-
tion or posting only would violate the Act as well.
822
Vol. 61:803, 1986
